Drilling for Black Gold: The Demarcation for Hydrocarbon Resources in the Caspian Sea by Ziyadzade, Ziyad
Chicago Journal of International Law 
Volume 16 Number 1 Article 12 
6-1-2015 
Drilling for Black Gold: The Demarcation for Hydrocarbon 
Resources in the Caspian Sea 
Ziyad Ziyadzade 
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ziyadzade, Ziyad (2015) "Drilling for Black Gold: The Demarcation for Hydrocarbon Resources in the 
Caspian Sea," Chicago Journal of International Law: Vol. 16: No. 1, Article 12. 
Available at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol16/iss1/12 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Chicago Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please 
contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu. 
Drilling for Black Gold: The Demarcation of Hydrocarbon
Resources in the Caspian Sea
Ziyad Ziyadzade*
Abstract
This Comment examines the division of oil and natural gas reserves in the Cafpian Sea
through the legal prism supplied by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. So far, the academic literature concerned
with equitable apportionment of the Caspian's hydrocarbon resources has attempted to tackle
this issue through two generaly accepted legal regimes. The first, commonly identified as the
Law of the Sea, classifies the Caspian as a "sea" and divides the resources therein according to
a strict, treaty-based framework, which produces an outcome disadvantageous to some of the
littoral states. The second regime, customary international law, which identifies the Caspian as
a "lake," relies on an antiquated water-law principle and depends too much on the bilateral
and unilateral initiatives of the littoral states as a means of resolving disputes. As this
Comment demonstrates, both regimes have been ineffective in produing workable results or
curbing the se/f-interested behavior of the littoral states. As such, instead of employing the two
aforementioned legal regimes, this Comment explores the Caspian question using a novel legal
framework that provides for a clear dipute-resolution mechanism and strikes a middle ground
as to the individual states' ownership rights in the Caspian Sea.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Caspian Sea is the largest inland body of water in the world,
"approximately the same length as the Great Lakes of North America"' and
"approximately the size of Japan."2 It contains plentiful oil and natural gas
reserves, something explorer Marco Polo highlighted 700 years ago when "he
wrote of 'a fountain from which oil springs in great abundance."' 3 As of 2013,
the Caspian Sea was estimated to contain 48 billion barrels of oil and 292 trillion
cubic feet of natural gas.4 It is also of geopolitical import to the U.S., as the
division of the Caspian's borders implicates Iran's and Russia's energy and
political interests. Given the rich natural resources as well as the lack of any clear
territorial delineation, the Caspian littoral states have long disputed ownership
over certain offshore resources contained within the Sea. For example, the
Wikileaks cables show that in November of 2009, the Iranian government
moved its new Alborz-Iran oilrig towards territorial waters disputed between
Azerbaijan and Iran.' As such, establishing clear demarcations within the
Caspian Sea is all the more imperative to ensure equitable access to offshore
hydrocarbon resources as well as peaceful and cooperative resolution of
conflicts and disputes that have arisen between the littoral states.
So far, the academic literature has primarily focused on identifying the
geographical status of the Caspian Sea and inferring the applicable legal regime
based on that identification. However, as this Comment will demonstrate, this
approach has largely been ineffective and too open-ended, thus unable to
produce a clear and coherent result.6 Instead, this Comment will analyze the
Caspian question through a different legal prism: the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses (the Watercourse Convention). Section II will provide a brief
geographical and historical background on the Caspian Sea, by charting the
progression of the littoral states' respective positions and highlighting pertinent
agreements and events. Section III will address the existing legal regimes that
have been applied in the Caspian context, namely the law of the sea and
David N. Griffiths, What's in a Name? The legal Regime in the Caspian Sea (or Lake), 23 OCEAN Y.B.
161,163 (2009).
2 Kamyar Mehdiyoun, Ownership of Oil and Gas Resources in the Caspian Sea, 91 Alm. J. INT'L L. 179,179
(2000).
3 Robert Cullen, The Rise and Fall of the Caspian Sea, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, May 1999, available at
http://magma.nationalgeographic.com/media/ngm/9905/fngm/index.html.
4 See Section II.A, infra.
5 Iran, Aerba~lan In Tense Capian Standoff, Cables Show, EURASIANiT.ORG (Oct. 4, 2011),
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64268.
6 See Section III, infra.
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customary international law governing lakes, and conclude that neither one is
likely to solve the long-standing disagreements. Next, Section IV will argue that
the Watercourse Convention provides a useful and easily applicable framework
for resolving current and future territorial disputes in the Caspian, a mechanism
that the present legal framework lacks. In addition, the Watercourse Convention
contains within it principles which do not depend on the kind of rigid
geographical classification of the Caspian Sea that otherwise leads to biased and
unworkable results.
II. GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF
THE CASPIAN
A. Geography
The Caspian, consisting of 393,000 square kilometers of water, is bordered
by five states: Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Russia, and Kazakhstan.7
Kazakhstan stretches along 30.8% of the coastline, Iran 18.7%, Russia 18.5%,
Turkmenistan 16.8%, and Azerbaijan 15.2%.8 The Caspian lacks any direct
outlet to an ocean, and it is only linked to the Black and Baltic Seas via the Volga
River (and various tributaries).9 In addition to housing sturgeon-the source of
around 90% of the world's caviar market-the Caspian also contains oil and
natural gas reserves." The United States Energy Information Administration
(the EIA) estimates that "48 billion barrels of oil and 292 trillion cubic feet of
natural gas [are contained] in proved and probable reserves in the wider Caspian
basins area, both from onshore and offshore fields."11 Most of these reserves are
offshore or concentrated around the northern coast,1 2 with the majority of oil
reserves located in the northern part of the Caspian and the largest quantity of
natural gas reserves in its southern sector.13
7 See Griffiths, supra note 1, at 163.
8 Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 179.
9 See id.
10 See Griffiths, supra note 1, at 163-64; see also United States Energy Information Administration
[hereinafter EIA], Caipian Sea Region, at 8 (Aug. 26, 2013), available at
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Caspian-Sea/caspian-sea.pdf ("The area has
significant oil and natural gas reserves from both offshore deposits in the Caspian Sea itself and
onshore fields in the Caspian basin.").
11 EIA, supra note 10, at 8; see also, Griffiths, supra note 1, at 164 ("Much of this resource is below the
seabed, which is why defining the maritime legal regime has become so contentious.").
12 See EIA, supra note 10, at 8 ("41% of total Caspian crude oil and lease condensate (19.6 billion
bbl) and 36% of natural gas (106 TcF) exists in offshore fields.").
13 See id. The EIA reckons that an extra 16.6 billion bbl of oil (35%) and 130 TcF of natural gas
(45%) are found onshore within 100 miles of the coast, and that 12 billion bbl of oil and 56 TcF
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In terms of actual oil production, the Caspian basin produced around 3.4%
of the world's supply of crude oil in 2012-that is, an average of 2.6 million
bbl/d (barrels per day) of crude and lease condensate. 4 Although Kazakhstan's
onshore oil fields used to be the largest contributor to the region's oil
production, Azerbaijan's offshore production has become increasingly
important, mainly because of the development of its Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli field
group from 2006 to 2008.1' Albeit less important to the economies of the littoral
states, natural gas production is prominent in the region as well. 16 Here,
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are the primary actors: the former's production
occurs mainly offshore while the latter's comes from its onshore fields.' 7 In turn,
only 12% of Turkmenistan's natural gas production comes from the Caspian
Sea, whereas Iran and Russia, in addition to Uzbekistan, "have virtually no
production in the Caspian area."' 8 That said, the EIA suggests that future
growth in the Caspian's hydrocarbon production will come not from oil, but
from the region's natural gas reserves, in large part due to their "significant and
dispersed nature.""
B. History
To fully understand the gradual progression of the five littoral states'
claims regarding their respective ownership rights in the Caspian Sea, in addition
to unearthing the primary motivating force behind those arguments, a brief
background summarizing important historical events and salient geopolitical
changes surrounding the Caspian is warranted. Accordingly, this subsection will
focus on three distinct periods in the Caspian Sea's history: the pre-Soviet
period, the Soviet period, and the post-Soviet period. As this subsection will
demonstrate, the littoral states have, to this day, maintained largely divergent
positions with respect to the delineation of hydrocarbon resources within the
Caspian, a situation that can be explained by one simple factor: access to oil.
of gas are located onshore in the Caspian Sea basins, mainly in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and
Turkmenistan. Id.
14 Id. at 11 ("Around 35% of that came from offshore fields in the Caspian Sea, with the rest
produced in onshore fields in the Caspian basins.").
15 See id.
16 See id. at 14.
17 See id. (noting that "Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan contain the majority of oil resources in the
Caspian basins").
18 Id.
19 Id. Perhaps this conclusion is even more warranted in light of the recent drop in global oil prices.
See, for example, The Economist explains: Why the oil price is falling, ECONOMIST (Dec. 8, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/12/economist-explains-4.
Vol. 16 No. 1
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1. The pre-Soviet and Soviet periods: Tsarist Russia and the
Bolshevik Revolution.
Since in the eighteenth century, only two states shared control over the
Caspian region-Tsarist Russia and Iran (the then-declining kingdom of
Persia).2" Beginning in the nineteenth century, Russia engaged in a series of wars
with Persia, prompted by the former's desire "to expand its territory
southward."21 All of these wars ended with the signing of treaties that, in
general, "fix[ed] the Russo-Persian land borders [and] regulated shipping rights
in the Caspian."22 The Golestan Treaty, which was signed by Tsarist Russia and
the Persian Empire in 1813, "barred Iran from deploying its naval forces in the
Caspian."23 The Turkmenchai Treaty, signed in 1828, imposed similar limitations
with respect to the "Persian naval presence on the Caspian."
24
This regime underwent a transformation after the Bolshevik Revolution of
1917.25 Worried about the possibility of additional foreign intervention,
especially following the three-year civil war between the Bolsheviks (the Reds)
and the counter-revolutionary nationalists (the Whites), Lenin's Communist
government made an effort to "normalize relations" with Iran "and [to]
encourage exclusion of foreign presence. ' 26 The 1921 Treaty of Friendship (the
1921 Treaty), signed between Iran and the Soviet Union, reestablished the naval
rights that the 1828 Turkmenchai Treaty previously denied to Iran.27 The 1935
Treaty of Establishment, Commerce and Navigation afforded each party "the
right to fish in its coastal waters up to a limit of ten nautical miles. '28 The 1940
20 See Griffiths, supra note 1, at 164.
21 Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 180.
22 Id. See also Griffiths, supra note 1, at 164 (noting three main treaties: Rasht (1729), Golestan (1813),
and Turkmenchai (1828)).
23 Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 180.
24 Griffiths, spra note 1, at 164; see Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 180.
25 See Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 180.
26 Griffiths, supra note 1, at 164.
27 See id. (noting that the 1921 Treaty "addressed Russia's concern about foreigners by prohibiting
foreign forces, foreign military transit, or even officers and crew from 'third powers' aboard
Persian ships"); BAHMAN AGHAi DIBA, THE CASPIAN SEA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 19
(2003) ("According to Article 11 of the 1921 Treaty, both sides should equally share the privileges
of navigation in all parts of the Caspian Sea, and there was no restraint placed upon their
nationals' vessels."). See also Cesare P. R. Romano, The Caspian and International Law: Like Oil and
Water?, in THE CASPIAN SEA: A QUEST FOR ENVIRONMENTAl. SECURITY 147 (William Ascher &
Natalia Mirovitskaya eds., 2000) ("As one of the ideological tenets of the early revolution was the
forswearing of imperialism and colonialism, [the 1921 Treaty] declar[ed] null and void the treaties
of Gulistan and Turkomanchai.").
28 Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 180 (citing Treaty of Establishment, Commerce and Navigation, with
Final Protocols and Annex, Aug. 25, 1935, Iran-USSR, Art. 15, 176 LNTS 301, 317).
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Treaty Regarding Trade and Navigation (the 1940 Treaty) reaffirmed these equal
navigational rights by requiring each party to treat the commercial vessels of the
other as its own.29 The 1940 Treaty also included provisions from the 1921
Treaty that excluded foreign nationals from the Caspian.3
In addition, the 1954 Agreement Concerning the Settlement of the
Frontier ascertained "[t]he location of the Soviet-Iranian land borders" that had
previously "remained unsettled."'" This comprehensive boundary treaty did not,
however, delimit the parties' respective sea boundaries,3 2 partly due to the fact
that the previous 1940 Treaty "had established a condominium principle of free
and equal navigation beyond the ten mile fishing limit."33 Attempting to remedy
this discrepancy, the Soviet Union in 1970 "conducted the internal
administrative exercise of dividing the Caspian" along the hypothetical "Astara-
Hosseinqoli line"34 as per the equidistance principle.3" While there were no
legally defined borders between the two parties in the Caspian Sea,36 Iran came
to treat the Caspian as part of the "Russian sphere of influence" and did not
venture north of the imaginary equidistant line.
37
29 See AGHAI, supra note 27, at 20 ("[A]ricles 12 and 13 of the [1940 Treaty] underscore in detail
both parties' equal and shared rights of navigation in the Caspian Sea."); Griffiths, supra note 1, at
165 ("There were only two exceptions: a ten-mile exclusive fishing zone off each coast, and
commitment to cabotage for coastal trade (Article 12)."); Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 180 ("They
reaffirmed the 10-mile fishing zone in the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of March 25,
1940.").
30 See AGHAI, supra note 27, at 21 ("In the letters annexed to the 1940 Treaty between Iran and the
USSR, the Caspian Sea is repeatedly referred to as 'the Soviet-Iranian Sea."'); Griffiths, supra note
1, at 165; Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 180 ("Beyond the 10-mile zone, fishing was allowed only to
Soviet and Iranian nationals.").
31 Griffiths, supra note 1, at 165.
32 See Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 180-81.
33 Griffiths, supra note 1, at 165.
34 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Soviet government arrived at the "Astara-
Hosseinqoli" line by pinpointing the location of its land boundaries with Iran: on the west, Iran
and the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic-part of the Soviet Union-met at the coastal town
of Astara; on the east, Iran and the Turkmenistan Republic met near Hosseinqoh. Id.
35 In general, the equidistance principle postulates that the states' maritime boundaries ought to be
determined according to a median line that is equidistant from the neighboring states' shores. See
,generaly Nugzar Dundua, Delimitation of Maitime Boundaries Between Adjacent States, available at
http://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff programme-home/felows-pages/felows-papers
/dundua- 0607georgia.pdf.
36 See AGHAI, supra note 27, at 20 (noting that "[t]he two concerned countries had in no way
delimited their sea borders in any legal manner").
37 AGHAI, supra note 27, at 25; Griffiths, supra note 1, at 165-66 (explaining that Iran accepted that
there were no territorial waters within the Caspian except for the ten-mile fishing limit).
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The mutual understanding between the Soviet Union and Iran in regards to
the exploitation of hydrocarbon resources was far less concrete. In practice, Iran
did not actively participate in oil or natural gas production.3 8 One of its laws,
passed in 1949, "effectively asserted [Iran's] national jurisdiction over the natural
resources of the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf in the Persian Gulf
and the Gulf of Oman," but remained "silent" with respect to those located in
the Caspian Sea.39 Further, "[t]here is no evidence that the Soviet Union ever
consulted Iran on its Caspian oil operations. 40 However, as the following
subsection demonstrates, this regime experienced a radical change in the face of
the eventual breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991.41
2. The post-Soviet period: a flurry of unilateral activity.
The 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union significantly complicated matters by
"multipl[ying] existent competing interests. ' 42 On December 8, 1991, the
founder states of the Soviet Union-the Soviet Socialist Republics of Belarus,
Ukraine, and the Russian Federation-signed the Minsk Agreement, signifying
the political end of the Soviet Union.43 These countries also established the
Commonwealth of Independent States (the CIS), a regional organization
designed to mitigate numerous problems regarding state succession,' including
38 See AGHAI, supra note 27, at 25 ("The Iranian government did not have any active program for
exploration and exploitation of oil and gas resources in the Caspian Sea, while in the Russian side,
especially Azerbaijan, they have been exploiting the oil resources on a large scale for the last [fifty]
years.").
39 Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 181. Although the intent of the Iranian legislature is unclear, one
scholar has suggested that the Iranian lawmakers attempted to avoid sharing the Caspian with its
more technologically superior neighbor, which is why they never mentioned the 1940 Treaty in
the 1949 law and thus refused to apply its principles to divide the Caspian's continental shelf and
subsoil hydrocarbon resources. See id. ("According to the then [Iranian] deputy director of the
Iranian Foreign Ministry's Institute of Political and International Studies, the legislative intent was
to distinguish the Caspian legal regime from those of other bodies of water.").
40 Id. at 182. Although Iran viewed such Soviet behavior as a breach of the "common seas" principle
embodied in the 1940 Treaty, it nevertheless did not raise any diplomatic objections for fear of
"antagoniz[ing] its powerful northern neighbor." Id.
41 See Section II.B.2, infra.
42 Mariangela Gramola, State Succession and the Delimitation of the Caspian Sea, 14 ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L.
237, 248 (2004).
43 See id. at 247.
44 See id. See also Faraz Sanei, Tbe Caspian Sea Legal Regime, Pipeline Diplomag, and the Prospects for Iran's
Isolation from the Oil and Gas Fren,-r Reconciling Tehran's Legal Options nith its Geopolitical Realities, 34
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'I. L. 681, 697 (2001) (noting that the creation of the CIS "caused a regional
power vacuum, with major 'external powers' including Iran, Turkey, and the United States,
seeking to exert political, economic, and cultural influence over the new vulnerable states"). For a
detailed account of the resultant "power vacuum" and its geopolitical implications, see id. at 697-
710.
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the question of "delimiting the boundaries of the new international subjects, as
well as ... of the predecessor State," that is, the Russian Federation."
Instead of two, five states now surrounded the Caspian Sea (Iran and
Russia, in addition to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, the three
former members of the Soviet Union). This multiplication of interests gave way
to novel, more complicated geopolitical circumstances. Each state began
assuming its own idiosyncratic position with respect to the Caspian, which in
turn resulted in the formation of two main politico-ideological camps.46 On the
one hand, Russia and Iran agreed to maintain the "condominium regime"
established by the prior Soviet-Iranian treaties.4" On the other hand, Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan all claimed that the Caspian ought to have been
divided, or "partitioned," among the five littoral states48 and questioned the
legitimacy of the past Soviet-Iranian treaties under the 1978 Vienna Convention
on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties.49 The formation of these two
ideological camps notwithstanding, what ensued was "a confusing panorama of
unilateral initiatives, shifting alliances, and consequent disputes."5" The following
paragraphs will evaluate and explore in greater detail the littoral states' evolving
arguments vis-A-vis their respective ownership rights within the Caspian Sea.
45 See Gramola, supra note 42, at 260.
46 See Griffiths, supra note 1, at 166.
47 See Andrei Volodin, The International Politics of Enegy in the Caspian Sea Basin: Russia, Turkey and the
Pipeline Project, in THE CASPIAN SEA: A QUEST FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY 139 (William
Ascher & Natalia Mirovitskaya eds., 2000) ("According to the condominium regime, only a costal
strip [twenty-five] meters in depth belongs to the neighboring territory, and main water resources
are administered by general consent."). See also Romano, supra note 27, at 149 (claiming that "the
condominium thesis has gradually lost credibility as all Caspian states, Russia included, since the
break-up of the USSR have done very little to behave as actual joint-owners") (emphasis in
original).
48 See Romano, supra note 27, at 149; Griffiths, supra note 1, at 166.
49 Vienna Convention on Succession of States, Aug. 23, 1978, 1946 U.N.T.S. 3. Under the Vienna
Convention, the common rule is that treaties signed by predecessor states bind newly independent
states. However, there is an important exception in Article 34, paragraph 2, which provides that
the rule does not apply "if the states concerned otherwise agree; or it appears from the treaty or is
otherwise established that the application of the treaty would be incompatible with the object and
purpose of the treaty or would radically change the conditions for its operation." Id. art. 34,
2(a)-(b).
5 Griffiths, supra note 1, at 166; see also EIA, supra note 10, at 5 ("Because the countries could not
agree unanimously on the Caspian's legal status, the coastal countries operate[d] in a mix of
unilateral and bilateral actions, based on differing economic and political interests.").
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After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation assumed the
USSR's position as its legitimate successor.5" In the international space, this
meant that Russia argued for the application of the 1921 and 1940 Soviet-Iranian
treaties to the Caspian question. 2 In particular, Russia claimed that because the
Caspian was a landlocked body of water, extant international norms, such as the
law of the sea, did not apply to it. 3 Instead, Russia argued that what governed
the Caspian was the condominium principle enshrined in the 1921 and 1940
Soviet-Iranian treaties, according to which exploration and exploitation of
hydrocarbon resources were to be jointly shared among the littoral states.5 4
Moreover, the Russian government contended that all of the successor states
were bound by these agreements in part because they inherited the obligations of
the former common state, that is, the Soviet Union.5 Some scholars have
criticized Russia's initial approach, claiming that its focus on the "obsolete"
Soviet-era treaties was ill suited to address the resulting post-Soviet legal vacuum
as well as the "key issues of regional security, trade and communication among
Caspian states."56
Eventually, the above mentioned legal position of the Russian government
changed when its Ministry of Fuel and Power began assisting Azerbaijan in the
country's negotiations with Western oil companies. 7 First, in November of
1996, Russia "propos[ed] a hybrid plan that combined Azerbaijan's position,
calling for national sectors in the Caspian, with Iran's and Russia's positions in
support of shared use and ownership," such that each state would possess
"national sovereignty over the mineral resources within forty-five miles of [its]
coast, with the middle area to be left for joint development." 8 Second, in
February of 1998, Russia capitulated to the powerful oil interests within its
51 See AGHAI, supra note 27, at 32 (noting that Russia "assumed the seat of the USSR in the United
Nations... , accepted the debts of the former Soviet regime, [and] declared it was fully
committed to the 1921 and 1940 treaties").
52 See id. at 32-33.
53 See Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 185.
54 See AGHAI, supra note 27, at 32-33; Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 185.
55 See Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 185-86. As an example of this position, in 1994, the Russian
Ministry of Foreign affairs, in response to Azerbaijan's ongoing negotiation of an $8 billion deal
with a Western consortium of oil companies, sent a letter to the United Nations Secretary-
General threatening that Russia would take all the necessary steps to restore and maintain the
legal order in the Caspian Sea. See id. at 185.
56 Romano, supra note 27, at 148. See also id. ("Indeed, there are not many treaty-based or customary
rights and duties that could be carried over to the successors, while those few that can be
transmitted are patently inadequate to answer the challenges of the twenty-first century.").
57 See Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 186.
58 Id. (noting also that Azerbaijan never subscribed to this compronmise). This hybrid plan was also
known as the "modified medial line (MML) principle." Griffiths, supra note 1, at 168.
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government and declared its support for sectoral division of the entire Caspian
seabed. 9 In line with this stance, the Russian government signed two new
agreements: one with Kazakhstan in July of 1998,60 to which Iran and
Turkmenistan objected,6' and another with Azerbaijan in January of 2001.62
Although this move represented a "significant development towards the genesis
of a modern Caspian legal regime," it left open the issue of enforcement and
"also which rights each Caspian state [would] accord itself and the other within
its area.""
Similar to Russia's stance, Iran's initial position "was more or less based on
the validity of the 1921 and 1940 treaties. '64 "Because of [the Caspian's] unique
geographical characteristics," Iran's argument went, the international rules and
norms regarding seas were "not applicable to it."6 Rather, the 1921 and 1940
Soviet-Iranian treaties controlled.66 In practice, this meant that the littoral states
would have to use the Caspian's hydrocarbon resources on a shared basis, at
least until they could come up with a new controlling multilateral legal regime.67
However, due to Russia eventually shifting its view and Azerbaijan's increasing
recalcitrance with respect to the "shared ownership" proposition, Iran changed
its position as well.68 In September of 1998, Iran officially declared its support
for dividing the Caspian into five sectors, with the caveat that such division
59 See Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 187.
60 See id.
61 See Griffiths, supra note 1, at 168.
62 See id. at 169. The Kazakhstan agreement divided the northern part of the Caspian seabed based
on the equidistant lines. See Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 187. It is worth noting that the two
agreements did not apply to Caspian waters.
63 Romano, supra note 27, at 149, 150.
64 AGHAI, supra note 27, at 34.
65 Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 182. Iran's argument of course ignored the fact that the Caspian is not
completely landlocked and could indeed be classified as a sea. See the discussion in Section III,
infra.
66 See Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 182.
67 See id. ("The intent of the parties... to own and use the Caspian on a shared basis can readily be
seen from the repeated references in the Treaties to the Caspian as a 'Soviet-Iranian sea."'). In an
effort to arrive at such a common legal regime, the Iranian government in 2004 proposed the
creation of the Caspian States Cooperation Organization, which was rejected by the other littoral
states. See Griffiths, supra note 1, at 170.
68 See Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 183.
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apply both to the Caspian waters and seabed69 and delimit 20% shares for each
littoral state. 0
Azerbaijan has maintained a stance on the Caspian Sea's boundaries that is
completely divergent from Russia and Iran's, although it is unclear what exact
geographic classification it has chosen to support its position.' In short,
Azerbaijan wanted to achieve a complete sectoral division of the Caspian-
including its waters and seabed-based on the equidistant line.72 First,
Azerbaijan claimed that it was not bound by the 1921 and 1940 Soviet-Iranian
treaties.73 Second, Azerbaijan argued that even if the Soviet-Iranian treaties
applied, they did not govern the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbon
resources, only fishing and navigation.74 Third, the Azeris contended that state
practice prior to 1991 validated their overall position of delineating the Caspian
according to national sectors.75
Economic considerations largely explain Azerbaijan's position. Were the
Caspian Sea divided as Azerbaijan claims it should be, some of the biggest oil
and natural gas reserves found in the Caspian would be under Azerbaijan's
sovereign control.7 6 This outcome would not only attract much-desired foreign
investment into Azeri oil projects, but would also exclude the Iranian
69 See id.
70 See lrina Paliashvili, Caspian Basin Delimitation and Joint Development; Options and Constraints (Discussion
of the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea), at 8 (Nov. 11, 2002), available at
http://www.rulg.com/documents/ Presentation%20Legal%2OStatus%2OCaspian.doc.
71 Compare Sergei V. Vinogradov, The 'Tug of War" in the Caspian: Legal Positions of the Coastal States, in
THE CASPIAN SEA: A QUEST FOR ENVIRONMENTAl. SECURITY 197 (William Ascher & Natalia
Mirovitskaya eds., 2000) ("Azerbaijan treats the Caspian Sea as an 'international or boundary lake,'
the floor and the superjacent waters of which should be divided ... into zones under [the littoral
states] complete control in accordance with the sectoral principle."), with Sanei, supra note 44, at
755 (claiming that Azerbaijan has abided by the principles of the law of the sea, "recognizing
[that] the existence of territorial seas and exclusive economic zones should apply to the Caspian").
Regardless of the geographic classification, the end result is very similar, if not the same, as the
following paragraphs demonstrate.
72 See Mehdiyoun, sipra note 2, at 183.
73 In support of this argument, Azerbaijan cited the principle of "rebus sic stanibus"-or fundamental
change in circumstances-as well as the principle of "clean slate," which postulates that newly-
independent states can shape their own future post-colonization. See AGHAI, supra note 27, at 39.
74 See AGHAI, supra note 27, at 39; Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 183.
75 See Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 183 (noting that an inter-republic division based on the imaginary
"Astara-Hosseinqoli" line of the Caspian into a Soviet zone and then into smaller zones "was
approved by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in 1993, two years after the breakup of
the Soviet Union"). In addition, Azerbaijan emphasized the fact that it has been "exploiting
Caspian oil resources since [sic] long tine [sic] ago, and Iran, as the only other party to those
treaties has never objected to the existing practice." AGHAI, supra note 27, at 39.
76 See Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 184.
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government from any decision-making process, a result that the U.S.
government has fully supported."7 As part of its unilateral effort, in February of
1998, Azerbaijan reached a general agreement with Turkmenistan on the division
of the Caspian seabed, though they still disagree about how exactly the
equidistant lines should be drawn.
8
Kazakhstan has treated the Caspian as an enclosed sea, arguing that the
rules and principles of the law of the sea should determine the governing legal
regime. 9 Two main arguments have underlined Kazakhstan's position: first,
each of the littoral state's borders should include a territorial sea extending up to
twelve nautical miles; second, the remainder of the Caspian should be dividedinto exclusive economic zones. 80  Like with Azerbaijan's position, such
delimitation would bolster Kazakhstan's access to hydrocarbon resources,
granting it control over "approximately 113,000 km of the Caspian surface."81
However, due in large part to geopolitical and geographic reasons, Kazakhstan
has also been willing to compromise. A landlocked state with no access to the
high seas except via rivers and canals flowing across Russia's territory,
Kazakhstan "is almost completely dependent on transit through Russian
territory, which weakens its bargaining position vis-A-vis Russia."8 2 This
consideration explains why Kazakhstan was willing to enter into an Agreement
with Russia in 1998, which delimited the northern portion of the Caspian Sea
with respect to subsoil and mineral resources.83
77 See id. The gravity of the Caspian question's geopolitical consequences became apparent when, in
September of 1994, the Azeri government angered both Russia and Iran by signing the "Contract
of the Century," which "issued licenses to a consortium of Western oil companies for exploration
and development of offshore oil fields that it considered to be within its own jurisdiction."
Griffiths, supra note 1, at 166.
78 See Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 184-85; EIA, supra note 10, at 8 ("Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan
both claim the Serdar (Turkmenistan)/Kyapaz (Azerbaijan) field, originally discovered in 1959 by
Azerbaijani geologists.").
79 See Vinogradov, spra note 71, at 197 (noting that these principles include "those relating to the
establishment of a territorial sea, an exclusive economic zone and a continental shelf by each
coastal state"); see also Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 187 ("Accordingly, Kazakhstan supports the
establishment nl of internal and territorial waters and an exclusive economic zone."). For a more
detailed discussion of the principles of the law of the sea, see Section II1, infra.
80 See Sanei, supra note 44, at 756.
81 Id.
82 Vinogradov, supra note 71, at 197 (claiming that Azerbaijan does not share Kazakhstan's
predicament because it "has at least one route-through Georgia-not controlled by Russia" and
"can effectively use oil transit, and transit revenues, through Russia as a 'carrot"').
83 See the discussion supra note 62. See also Sanei, supra note 44, at 756-57 ("Kazakhstan has taken a
very careful position on the status of the Caspian because it does not want to escalate conflict
with Moscow.').
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Turkmenistan, on the other hand, has been less exact and more ambiguous
in its argumentation. It essentially pioneered unilateral activity among the five
littoral states when, in 1992, it passed a law "extending its ten-mile coastal zone
out to twelve, and identif[ying] its southern terminus at the Astara-Hasanqoli
line [as] a maritime boundary," 84 meaning, as its "maritime economic zone."8'
Moreover, like Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan decided to issue its own licenses to
Western oil companies in 1997.6 This international tender was ultimately
unsuccessful due in large part to its "politicized nature"8 7 and because of
Turkmenistan's ongoing territorial dispute with Azerbaijan over two oil fields in
the Caspian.88 Finally, in addition to the general agreement reached with
Azerbaijan in February of 1998,89 Turkmenistan signed a similar agreement with
Kazakhstan in March of 1997, dividing the Caspian into sectors by the use of
equidistant lines. 90
As evident, the driving force behind the littoral states' numerous and, at
times, contradictory unilateral and bilateral actions was, and still is, of course,
access to oil and natural gas reserves. Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and
Kazakhstan-the states closest to the largest oil fields-have advocated for
some type of a sectoral partition. 9' Contrarily, Russia and Iran, whose coasts are
farther away from these oil and gas deposits, initially argued for a shared-
ownership regime, eventually acquiescing to the demands of their counterparts
albeit with significant qualifications and caveats.92 The resulting current positions
of the littoral states can be summarized as follows. First, Russia, Kazakhstan,
and Azerbaijan seem to be in agreement over the sectoral divisions of the
Caspian in its northern part, "which encompasses sovereignty over all resources
on and below the surface waters and the seabed." 93 Second, it could be said that
84 Griffiths, supra note 1, at 166.
85 Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 187.
86 See Griffiths, supra note 1, at 167.
87 Vinogradov, supra note 71, at 198.
88 See Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 185 & n.59 (mentioning the Kyapaz/Serdar oil field as one of the
oil fields disputed by Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan). See also Vinogradov, supra note 71, at 198
(claiming that Turkmenistan's "international tender for developing seabed blocks off its Caspian
cost" failed because it "put on offer the disputed Serdar oilfield'".
89 See the discussion supra note 78.
90 See Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 187. For an extensive list of other bilateral initiatives, see Ilias
Bantekas, Bilateral Del'mitalion of the Caspian Sea and the Exclusion of Tbird Paries, 26 INT'I.J. MARINE
& COASTAl. L. 47, 52-54 (2011).
91 See Romano, supra note 27, at 149.
92 See id.
93 Bantekas, supra note 90, at 54. The only disagreement here is Russia's stance vis-a-vis the
delineation of the Caspian waters. See the discussion supra note 62.
Summer 2015
ZyadZade
Chicago Journal of International Law
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan generally agree on the notion that
the Caspian ought to be divided based on the equidistant-lines principle,
although they still seem to disagree on the particular way of drawing such a
line.94 Third, Iran appears to be an outlier: as stated earlier, its "government has
petitioned for equal division by giving each country only [20%] of the sea floor
and surface of the Caspian. ' '9 5 Further, Iran's position, although similar to
Russia's, differs with respect to the division of the Caspian waters: Russia has
refused to apply the sectoral delineation principle to the Caspian waters, while
Iran takes a 20%-share view on division of both the Caspian waters and the
seabed.
III. EXISTING PROPOSALS: THE LAW OF THE SEA AND
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Given the emergence of these divergent positions, it is unsurprising that
much of the academic literature about the Caspian Sea has been concerned with
identifying the legal system that is to govern the body of water and the disputes
arising therefrom.96 Commentators have noted the salience of this project as a
means to ensure that the resulting regime "takes into account [the Caspian's]
characteristics and history, and ... serves the diverse needs as well as the
common interests of the people along its shores."9 The need for a resolution is
further amplified because the unilateral acts in question are in conflict with
precepts of international law.98 For instance, the International Court of Justice
(the ICJ) has stated that "[n]o maritime delimitation between States with
opposite or adjacent coasts may be effected unilaterally by one of those States"
and that "[s]uch delimitation must be sought and effected by means of
agreement." 99 This section will provide a brief overview of the academic
framework that has attempted to resolve the Caspian disputes and highlight the
existing paradigm's shortcomings.
94 See Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 187. But see Griffiths, supra note 1, at 176 (noting that
Turkmenistan is in support of the MML division until the Caspian states reach an agreement on a
controlling regime and has actually backed Iran's plan).
95 EIA, supra note 10, at 5; see also the discussion supra Section II.B.2.
96 See for example, Griffiths, supra note 1; Julie M. Folger, A Proposal to End the Stalemate in the Caipian
Sea Negotiations, 18 OHIO ST. J. DIsp. RESOL. 529 (2003); Barry Hart Dubner, The Caspian: Is It a
Lake, a Sea or an Ocean and Does It Matter? The Danger of Utiliz ng Unikateral Approaches to Resolving
RegonallInternational Issues, 18 DICK.J. INT'I L. 253 (2000).
97 Vinogradov, supra note 71, at 198-99 ('Without co-operative resource management, unrestrained
competition will lead to inefficient exploitation and a 'tragedy of the commons."').
98 See Alexandre N. Vylegjanin, Basic L-gal Issues of the Management of Natural Resources of the Caspian Sea,
in THE CASPIAN SEA: A QUEST FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY 166 (William Ascher & Natalia
Mirovitskaya eds., 2000)
99 See id. at 167 (citation omitted).
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In general, there are two well-established legal regimes that have been used
to address the long-standing territorial disputes regarding the Caspian. Which
one applies hinges on the geographical classification of the Caspian Sea itself. If
the Caspian is classified as a "sea," the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS or the Convention on the Law of the Sea) governs the
regime.100 If the Caspian is instead classified as a "lake," then customary
international law (broadly defined) governs the regime."'
With approximately 135 signatories, UNCLOS was drafted with the
intention of "resolving problems that may develop with regard to jurisdiction in
ocean and maritime environmental situations that could arise during the
exploration of various regions."10 2 Article 122 of UNCLOS defines a "sea" as a
"gulf, basin or sea surrounded by two or more States and connected to another
sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting ... of the territorial seas and
exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States."'1 3 The initial question
of UNCLOS's applicability to the Caspian Sea has not been fully settled in the
academic literature. One commentator has suggested that the Caspian, by itself,
fits the UNCLOS definition of a "sea," given that it is linked to the Black Sea via
the Don-Volga canal." 4 Another commentator, however, has argued that having
no "internationally navigable outlet" or any other connection to one of the
world's oceans, the Caspian does not fall within the UNCLOS definition and is
neither an "enclosed sea" nor an "international lake."'
0 5
10 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 122, U.N. Doc. A/conf. 62/122, Oct. 7,
1982, 21 ILM 1282 [hereinafter UNCLOS. For a concise overview of UNCLOS's basic
principles, see Sanei, supra note 44, at 790-95.
101 Unlike the regime under UNCLOS, the current customary law regime that governs lakes and
waterways is far less uniform and more context-specific: for starters, there is no single extant
international legal document that applies to such waters. See Griffiths, supra note 1, at 182.
102 Folger, supra note 96, at 539. As of October 3, 2014, among the five littoral states, only Iran and
Russia had ratified UNCLOS. See Chronological Lists of Ratifications of Accessions and Successions to the
Convention and the Related Agreements As at 3 October 2014, Oceans & Law of the Sea (Oct. 3, 2014),
available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronologicallists of ratifications.
htm#. But they are also the only ones to advocate that the Caspian not be classified as a "sea."
See,for example, Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 182-83, 185-87; see also Griffiths, supra note 1, at 179-
80 ("The reasons.., are primarily to do with the issue of maritime boundary delimitation and its
impact on the offshore hydrocarbon resources, and the desire to limit unwanted foreign
presence.").
103 UNCLOS, supra note 100, art. 122.
104 See Dubner, supra note 96, at 277-78 ("The canal also permits the accidental introduction of the
exotic species from the Black Sea, via ballast waste discharge from the world's waters.").
105 See Folger, supra note 96, at 539-40 & n.47 (reasoning that "(1) for centuries, the countries
surrounding the Caspian have exercised exclusive control over its use; (2) it has no internationally
navigable outlet; (3) it has no contact with the world's oceans; and (4) the only navigable outlets
are long inland Russian waterways that cannot be used without Russian permission") (internal
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Notwithstanding the abovementioned question of applicability, the
intended results of applying the Convention on the Law of the Sea could be
summarized as follows. Under the "sea" classification, UNCLOS would confer
"a twelve-mile territorial water zone followed by a two-hundred mile exclusive
economic rights zone" based on the equidistant line."0 6 Turkmenistan and
Azerbaijan, for example, would end up having exclusive access to the offshore
hydrocarbon resources, to which Iran would not have access.' Thus, the
UNCLOS regime would create national sectors based on equidistant division of
the natural resources.0 8 Further, each littoral state would exercise its "right to
explore, exploit, conserve, and manage" the hydrocarbon resources within the
designated exclusive economic zone. °9
On its face, UNCLOS provides an easily applicable and efficient legal
framework that may very well counteract the flurry of bilateral agreements and
unilateral initiatives among the five littoral states. 110 In addition, UNCLOS
provides for a dispute-resolution mechanism."' That said, the fact that only two
of the littoral states-Iran and Russia-are parties to UNCLOS, coupled with
Iran's desire to have the Caspian Sea classified as a lake rather than a sea,
diminishes the likelihood that UNCLOS will actually give way to a consistent,
unanimous legal regime." 2 Although the littoral states could certainly use
UNCLOS as a framework to structure future negotiations, the default position,
or the starting point, seems to weigh heavily against Russia and Iran's positions.
To reiterate, UNCLOS confers on each littoral state a twelve-mile territorial sea
and an exclusive economic zone drawn upon the equidistant line; Russia and
Iran, on the other hand, oppose such "pure sectoral sovereignty," with the
former advocating for joint control of the Caspian waters, and the latter rejecting
the equidistance principle itself."3 In other words, UNCLOS's applicability rests
on a strict classification of the Caspian that produces a result unfavorable to the
interests of both Russia and Iran, the two countries that, as stated above, are the
only ones among the five littoral states that have actually adopted UNCLOS. At
quotation marks omitted). But even if the Caspian does not meet the strict definition, which in
turn means that the five littoral states cannot be forced to abide by UNCLOS's terms, they are still
free to use UNCLOS as one of the "established frameworks to guide their negotiations." Id. at
537.
106 Id. at 538; see also EIA, supra note 10, at 5.
107 See EIA, supra note 10, at 5.
108 See Folger, supra note 96, at 540.
109 See Sanei, supra note 44, at 801.
110 See id. at 795-801 (outlining the many ways UNCLOS could apply to the Caspian Sea).
11 See UNCLOS, supra note 100, art. 287.1.
112 See Griffiths, supra note 1, at 179-81.
113 See Sanei, supra note 44, at 765-66.
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the same time, the case for UNCLOS's mandatory application is rather weak." 4
This all means that a productive dialogue within its legal framework is less likely
to take place.
The systems that govern international lake boundaries under customary
international law are in turn determined by the use of bilateral and multilateral
agreements and the principle of res communis, or the condominium approach.
115
Under this regime, precedent-both judicial and historical-is highly valued as
well. 1 6 Despite its seeming elegance, however, the application of customary
international law is less likely to make a difference in the current situation. First,
as already outlined, Russia and Iran-the two states that initially advocated for
shared ownership of the Caspian-have largely abandoned their support for the
condominium approach, "7 while the other three states never supported the
approach to begin with. What is more, one commentator has noted that "the
history of the littoral states' practice in the Caspian weakens the argument that
the Soviet Union and Iran [ever] regarded the Caspian as a common sea.' 118
Second, the application of the condominium approach is simply impractical, for
it entails a complete joint ownership of surface and seabed resources, an
outcome that the majority of the littoral states are unlikely to favor.119 Third,
relevant historical precedent, which mainly consists of various states bordering
lakes, seas, and other bodies of water agreeing to negotiate with each other and
114 See Griffiths, supra note 1, at 180-81.
115 See id. at 801, 802 ("The principle of res communis or condominium may be thought of as a
doctrinal outgrowth of the commonage principle of the laws of the sea."). In the Caspian context,
res communis assumes three chief arguments: (1) the 1940 Treaty defines the Caspian's current
status pursuant to the condominium regime; (2) as a unitary ecosystem, the Caspian requires
common environmental protection; and (3) international case law and precedent have used and
applied the condominium approach in delineating the boundaries of other lakes. See id. at 802.
116 See Griffiths, supra note 1, at 183-85 (discussing the Great Lakes precedent and its applicability in
the Caspian context); Folger, supra note 96, at 549-50 (same); Sanei, supra note 44, at 803
(discussing the Lake Constance precedent). See also Sanci, supra note 44, at 805 (claiming that the use
of res communis by way of judicial precedent, such as the ICJ's decision in the Gulf of Fonseca case, is
not as valuable because "none of the peculiarities of [that case] seem to exist in the Caspian Sea
case"). For an example of applicable judicial precedent, see Land, Island and Maritime Frontier
Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond., Nicar. intervening), 1992 I.C.J. 351 (Sept. 11).
117 See the discussion supra Section 11.B.2.
118 Sanei, supra note 44, at 804 (classifying as one example of this historical incongruity the Soviet
Union's exploitation of the Caspian's oil and gas reserves off Baku's cost without first acquiring
the consent of Iran).
119 See id. at 805 ("This impracticality is magnified when the prospect of rich hydrocarbon reserves is
introduced into the formula-one could easily imagine a situation where vague and undetermined
ownership rights ultimately lead to chaos and possible military conflict.").
Summer 2015
Z YadZade
Chicago Journal of International Law
establishing some form of a dispute resolution mechanism, 120 is highly unlikely
to matter. After all, it is precisely through attempted negotiations as well as
liberal use of bilateral agreements and unilateral actions that the five Caspian
states have managed to reach the current impasse. A peaceful and voluntary
resolution of the boundary disputes is certainly desirable, but judging from the
present climate and the history of disagreement among the five littoral states,
such a result will not be achieved absent some extraneous framework.' 2' Thus, a
new legal regime is imperative if the littoral states are to move beyond the
deadlock. This is where the Watercourse Convention comes in.
IV. SOLUTION: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
LAW AND NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES OF
INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES
A. Threshold Question of Applicability
At the outset, it bears noting that the Watercourse Convention (the
Convention)'22 has not generally been applied to the Caspian case in the legal
academic literature, which could partially be explained by its relative youth. 123
Also worth noting is that the Convention, on its face, may not literally apply in
the Caspian context because of the specific way it defines a "watercourse."' 24
According to Article 2(a) of the Convention, a "watercourse" is "a system of
surface waters and groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical
120 See, for example, Folger, supra note 96, at 552-53 (noting the example of Lake Constance as
"demonstrat[ing] the necessity not only of establishing good diplomatic relations among the
littoral states, but also of setting the groundwork for dispute resolution mechanisms that can be
used in the future to resolve other disputes").
121 It is worth noting that in 2003, the five littoral states did enter into a multilateral agreement, called
the Framework Convention for the Protection of the Maritime Environment of the Caspian Sea,
which aims to improve the environmental conditions in the Caspian basin. See generally Barbara
Januzs, The Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caipian Sea, 4
CHINESE J. INT'L L. 257 (2005). However, this agreement does not address the territorial
delineation within the Caspian Sea or the respective claims of the five littoral states as to the
hydrocarbon offshore reserves.
122 For the full text of the Watercourse Convention, see Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700 [hereinafter
Convention]; see also Aaron Schwabach, The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Customagy International Law and the Interests of Developing
Upper Riparians, 33 TE-X. INT'L L.J. 257 (1998) (discussing the Convention).
123 The Convention took full effect in August of 2014 after Vietnam became the thirty-fifth state to
ratify it. See Status of the Watercourses Convention, International Water Law Project (May 22, 2014),
available at http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/intldocs/watercourse-status.html.
None of the five Caspian states is a signatory to the Convention.
124 But see Romano, supra note 27, at 152 ("The definition of international watercourse provided by
the Convention is malleable enough to accommodate the Caspian.").
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relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a common terminus." 121
From the plain meaning of the definition, it might seem that the drafters
conceived of a watercourse as containing a non-static body of water as opposed
to a stationary, semi-enclosed lake or a sea. However, in its Draft Articles on the
Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (the Draft
Articles), 26 the International Law Commission (the ILC) provided a more
detailed explanation behind this definition that suggests otherwise. It states:
The term "watercourse" is defined as a "system of surface waters and
groundwaters."... The phrase "groundwaters" refers to the hydrologic
system composed of a number of different components through which
water flows, both on and under the surface of the land. These components
include rivers, lakes, aquifers, glaciers, reservoirs and canals. So long as these
components are interrelated with one another, they form part of the
watercourse. This idea is expressed in the phrase, "constituting by virtue of
their physical relationship a unitary whole." . . . It also follows from the
unity of the system that the term "watercourse" does not include
"confined" groundwater, meaning that which is unrelated to any surface
water. 127
Thus, to fit the definition of a watercourse, the Caspian has to constitute a
system of either "surface waters" or "groundwaters." Even assuming that the
Caspian does not constitute a "system of surface waters," it could very well serve
as a "system of ... groundwaters." First, the Caspian is part of a "hydrologic
system ... through which water flows.' 28 As an identifiable body of water, the
Caspian serves as one of the "number of different components" of this
hydrologic system, which include "rivers, lakes, aquifers, glaciers, reservoirs and
canals."' 29 Notwithstanding the legal implications of defining the Caspian as
either a sea or a lake, the definition provided by the ILC is expansive enough to
include the Caspian as part of the "system of ... groundwaters," hence as a
watercourse. 3 ' Second, if classified as a lake, the Caspian could be subject to the
Convention. This interpretation is supported elsewhere in the Draft Articles,
where the ILC explains its reasoning behind the definition of a "Watercourse
125 Convention, supra note 122, art. 2(a).
126 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fortj-Sixth Session: Draft Articles on the Law
of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, U.N. G.A.O.R., 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10,
UN Doc. A/49/10 (1994) [hereinafter Draft Articles].
127 Id. at 90.
128 Hydrology refers to the properties of Earth's water, in particular its movement with respect to
land. See also, Dubner, supra note 96, at 278 (noting that "130 large and small rivers flow into the
Caspian," including through the Don-Volga Canal that connects it to the Black Sea).
129 See Draft Articles, supra note 126, at 90.
130 See Dubner, note 96, at 279 & n.37 (highlighting that the Caspian has been previously identified as
a sea, as a lake-due to its inclusion in the list of "Major Lakes of the World"-and as a relict
marine basin).
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State."13 ' Therein, the ILC states that determining where a watercourse is located
depends on observable physical factors: "The most common examples would be
a river or stream that forms or crosses a boundary, or a lake through which a
boundary passes."' 32 Although this classification would be identical to the way
the Caspian is classified and governed under the general principles of customary
international law, it would not lead to any of the problems associated with that
regime, 133 namely, the now-abandoned principle of res communis and the lack of a
clearly defined legal framework.
Finally, the "flowing into a common terminus" requirement, included
towards the end of the Convention's definition of a "watercourse," is not
dispositive. As the ILC explains, once again:
The phrase "flowing into a common terminus" is modified by the word
"normally." This represents a compromise aimed not at enlarging the
geographic scope of the draft articles but at bridging the gap between, on
the one hand, those who urged simple deletion of the phrase "common
terminus" on the grounds, inter alia, that it is hydrologically wrong and
misleading and would exclude certain important waters and, on the other
hand, those who urged retention of the notion of common terminus in
order to suggest some limit to the geographic scope of the articles.134
Thus, the Caspian could still constitute a watercourse without necessariy
"flowing into a common terminus."'
135
While the ILC's Draft Articles do not have as much legal force as the plain
words of the Convention, they could nevertheless be used as a persuasive,
guiding source to strengthen the proposition that the Convention does apply in
the Caspian context. In addition, at least three commentators have separately
noted that the Convention could be applied to the Caspian Sea. 136 For example,
Article 3.3 of the Convention provides that parties "may enter into one or more
agreements... which apply and adjust the provisions of the present Convention
131 See also Convention, supra note 122, art. 2(c) (defining a Watercourse State as a "State Party to the
present Convention in whose territory part of an international watercourse is situated, or a Party
that is a regional economic integration organization, in the territory of one or more of whose
Member States part of an international watercourse is situated').
132 Draft Articles, supra note 126, at 90 ("The word 'situated' is not intended to imply that the water
in question is static .... [W]hile the channel, lake bed or aquifer containing the water is itself
stationary, the water it contains is in constant motion.") (emphasis added).
133 See Section IV.B, infra.
134 Draft Articles, supra note 126, at 89.
135 See Romano, supra note 27, at 152 ("Indeed, the Caspian does not flow into a common terminus
(it does not have effluents), though the adjective 'normally' allows for some flexibility.").
136 See, for example, Griffiths, supra note 1, at 183 (noting that "there are elements of the Convention
that could be adapted to the Caspian arrangement"); Sanei, supra note 44, at 806 (identifying the
Convention as "a possible third macro-model that may have a significant impact... with respect
to hydrocarbon ownership rights"); Romano, supra note 27, at 152.
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to the characteristics and uses of a particular international watercourse or part
thereof." '37 Broadly interpreted, this provision allows one or more of the littoral
states to avail itself of the Convention and use its provisions in accordance with
the geographic and hydrographic realities of the Caspian.'38
B. Core Provisions
Although the Convention is quite extensive, the relevant core provisions
can be found in Articles 5 through 7, which introduce the principle of "equitable
use" and the "no-harm" rule, and Article 33, which provides for a dispute-
settlement mechanism. 139 Article 5 establishes the "principle of equitable and
reasonable utilization and participation." 4 ' It instructs the parties to "participate
in the use, development and protection of an international watercourse in an
equitable and reasonable manner."14 ' Article 6 provides a list of factors to be
utilized in determining whether use is reasonable and equitable.'42 Article 7
establishes the "no-harm" rule, providing that "Watercourse States shall, in
utilizing an international watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate
measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other [W]atercourse
States."
143
Given the differing approaches evidenced in Articles 5 and 7, a scholarly
debate has emerged about what happens when the two Articles conflict. The
majority of scholars agree that in cases of clear conflict, "reasonable and
equitable use has more force," with some claiming that "the two can be
137 Convention, supra note 122, art. 3.3.
138 See also Griffiths, supra note 1, at 183 ("In other words, [the parties] can create their own
appropriate provisions to meet their particular circumstances if they agree to do so.").
139 See Lucius Caflisch, T1he Law of International Watercourses: Achievements and Cballenges, in
INTERNATIONAl LAW AND FRESHWATER: THE MULTIPLE CHALLENGES 29 (Laurence Boisson et
al. eds., 2013); Convention, supra note 122, art. 33.
140 See Caflisch, supra note 139, at 29.
141 Convention, supra note 122, art. 5.2.
142 See Caflisch, supra note 139, at 29 (claiming that "the factors and circumstances relevant for
determining equitable and reasonable utilization and participation recall, in one way at least, the
methods for apportioning the natural resources of the continual shelf"); see also Convention, supra
note 122, art. 6.1 (listing as some of the pertinent factors the geographic, hydrographic,
hydrological, climactic, and ecological considerations; social and economic needs of the
Watercourse States; the availability of alternatives to a particular use; the effects of watercourse
use; and the conservation and protection of the use of water resources).
143 Convention, supra note 122, art. 7.1; see also id. art 7.2 ("Where significant harm nevertheless is
caused to another fW]atercourse State, the States whose use causes such harm shall ... take all
appropriate measures ... to eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss
the question of compensation.").
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reconciled and are indeed compatible." 1" Further, "[t]hat the no-harm rule must
give way to that of equitable utilization is also attested to by the ICJ's judgment
in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, where the Court often refers to equitable use
but not to the no-harm rule."' The following situation exemplifies a possible
conflict: riparian states A and B use a watercourse. Subsequently, riparian states
C and D, who have not previously taken part in such use (that is, new entrants),
announce their desire to do so. Under the reasonable and equitable use model,
the new entrants could very well be entitled to use the watercourse. Under the
no-harm model, however, the new entrants' use of the watercourse could be
prohibited if such use would damage and harm States A and B.1 ' One scholar,
in analyzing the dispute between Ethiopia and Egypt over the use of the Nle
River, has found just such a conflict between the rules in Articles 5 and 7. 47
Based on the result described above, some have criticized the Convention,
noting that all the Convention does is emphasize the reconciliation of conflicts
among riparian states, falling short of providing practical solutions.'48
Additionally, the "equitable use and no-harm rules embedded in the Convention
are ambiguous, "fuzzy[,] and afford poor definition of rights,"'49 often
conflicting with the notion of state sovereignty. 5 1 What these objections ignore,
however, is that the Convention is by no means a panacea, and its potential
efficacy in solving the Caspian dispute should not be judged in absolute terms.
144 Edith Brown Weiss, Water Transfer and International Trade Law, in FRESH WATER AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 64 (Edith Brown Weiss et al., eds. 2005); see also Mohammed S.
Helal, Sharing Blue Gold: The 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses Ten Years On, 18 CoO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L & POL'Y 337, 364 (2007)
(concluding that what the no-harm principle prohibits is "not the causing of significant harm per
se, but rather the infliction of legal harm," that is, the infringement "on the ability of co-riparians
to enjoy their legal rights to and equitable share of the beneficial uses of an international
watercourse") (emphasis in original); SHLOMI DINAR, INTERNATIONAL WATER TREATIES:
NEGOTIATION AND COOPERATION ALONG TRANSBOUNDARY RIVERS 41 (2008) (arguing that
analytically, the "no-harm" rule could be interpreted as constituting but one factor in determining
what is "equitable use," such that "the two principles may not be two separate doctrines but
rather two sides of the same coin") (internal quotation marks omitted).
145 Caflisch, supra note 139, at 31 (discussing the Gabdkovo-Nagymaros case).
146 See id.
147 See Daniel Abebe, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Nile: The Economics of International Water Laaw, 15 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 27, 39 (2014) ("[TIhe Convention's two core articles-Articles 5 and 7-leave sufficient
ambiguity to permit both states to view the Convention as supportive of their respective legal
positions. Simply stated, there is no binding principle of international law that compels a
particular result for the parties.").
148 See, for example, DINAR, supra note 144, at 41 ("It does not say which state has the property rights
or which use by one state subordinates a different use by another state.").
149 Id.
150 See id. at 42.
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What the Convention does is "codify customary [international] law in the most
general terms" instead of providing "countries with specific guidelines,"' 51
thereby striking somewhat of a middle ground between the two proposed
solutions to the Caspian problem: the Convention on the Law of the Sea and
general customary international law principles.'52 As such, the strength of the
Convention is better evaluated relative to the two legal regimes that have so far
been applied to the Caspian case, and not on a standalone basis.
Before turning to the discussion of the Convention within the Caspian
context, another article warrants a separate mention. Article 33 of the
Convention provides for a dispute-settlement mechanism. It states that in the
event the parties enter a dispute that they are incapable of resolving through
negotiations, they may (i) request a mediation conducted by a third party, (ii)
submit the dispute to arbitration or the International Court of Justice, or (iii) if
incapable of settling the dispute within six months, refer to an independent fact-
finding commission.' 5
3
The fact-finding commission shall in turn be composed of two members,
each nominated by one of the parties to the dispute, and an additional member
"not having the nationality of any of the parties concerned chosen by the
nominated members who shall serve as Chairman."154 If, however, the parties
are unable to agree on a Chairman within three months of the beginning of the
dispute-settlement process, one party may request that the Secretary-General of
the United Nations appoint the Chairman instead. 55 Moreover, the fact-finding
commission may consist of only a single member, if one of the parties fails to
nominate a member within three months of the commencement of the
dispute.5 6 Finally, the Commission will determine its own procedure, and the
parties to the dispute may be compelled "to provide the Commission with such
information as it may require and, on request, to permit the Commission to have
access to their respective territory and to inspect any facilities, plant, equipment,
construction or natural feature relevant for the purpose of its inquiry."157
151 Id
152 For a more detailed comparison between the Convention and the two legal regimes, see the
discussion in Section IV.C, infra.
153 See Convention, supra note 122, art 33.1-4.
154 Id. art. 33.4.
155 See id. art. 33.5.
156 See id.
157 Id. art. 33.6-7.
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C. Applying the Watercourse Convention to the Caspian
Notwithstanding concerns about the efficacy of the Convention, applying
its principles has the potential to reconcile the conflicting arguments brought
forth by the five littoral states."5 8 First, with respect to the sectoral delimitation
in the northern part of the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan may argue
against Russia's refusal to divide the Caspian waters in a similar fashion by
relying on the relevant factors listed in Article 6 of the Convention. They could
claim under Article 5 of the Convention that equitable and reasonable use of the
Caspian waters and of the hydrocarbon resources contained therein, in addition
to the economic benefits derived therefrom, are denied to them by virtue of
Russia's intransigence."5 9 While not mandating a clear-cut outcome, such
reframing of this dispute-based on principles supplied by the Convention-has
the potential to push the parties beyond the current impasse. Moreover,
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan could rely on similar reasoning to
resolve the question of drawing equidistant lines among themselves. The
advantage here is that the three parties already have in place broader agreements
that divide the Caspian seabed-it is the drawing of equidistant lines that is
disputed. As such, the Convention can prove helpful because "[a]s an umbrella
agreement it does not pretend to replace individual agreements negotiated
between countries over specific disputes."'60 With a general framework in place,
the parties can use the principles in the Convention as theoretical guidelines so
as to further narrow down their arguments into applicable precepts of customary
international law. Once again, through adding extra theoretical ammunition to
the parties' arsenal, the Convention could afford them the opportunity to
overcome the existing deadlock, while at the same time preserving the progress
that has been achieved so far.
As to Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan and their disagreement over the
ownership of the two Caspian oil fields (particularly Kyapaz/Serdar),' 6' the
dispute will probably resolve somewhat differently. Relying on the fact that
158 For an overview of the Caspian states' normative positions, see Section II.B.2, supra.
159 Cf. Abebe, supra note 147, at 38 (noting that in its dispute with Egypt over the Nile River,
Ethiopia, as a new entrant and an upper riparian state, could similarly argue that the "Convention
implicitly rejects an appropriation approach to international watercourses, one that would have
assigned the right to exploit the international watercourse to the first state to utilize it, in favor of
a riparian approach that permits each riparian state to have equal use of the international
watercourse").
160 DINAR, supra note 144, at 42.
161 The Kyapaz/Serdar oilfield is of particular import to Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan because it
contains 50 million tons of oil reserves and is currently undeveloped. AZerbai/an & Turkmenistan:
Renewing Caspian Sea Eneg Dispute, EuRASIANET.ORG (uly 11, 2012),
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65646.
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Azerbaijani geologists were the first to discover the oilfield at issue in 1959,162
Azerbaijan will most likely refer to Article 5 and the no-harm rule. It will argue
that Azerbaijan was there first and that Turkmenistan's potential ownership of
the field will cause it significant harm. On the other hand, Turkmenistan, relying
on Article 5 of the Convention (including the factors listed in Article 6), can
claim that it is entitled to equitable use of the Caspian, which extends to and
includes ownership of the Kyapaz/Serdar field. 163 In this unusual case, with an
eye towards "attaining optimal and sustainable utilization," perhaps the best
outcome is to have the two parties negotiate over a possible joint ownership of
the Kyapaz/Serdar oilfield."6
Second, and on a broader scale, three of the littoral states (and, to a lesser
degree, Russia) could challenge Iran's wish to divide the Caspian into five equal
sectors, rather than according to the equidistant-line rule. As "new entrants,"
these states might contend that without the application of the equidistant-line
rule, they will be robbed of equitable use that is guaranteed to them under the
Convention. In response, Iran could retort that, under Article 7, it is entitled not
to be significantly harmed by the other states' use of the Caspian and that the
new entrants' use accomplishes precisely that. Iran's argument is probably less
persuasive than the others', given the fact that Article 5 (equitable-use principle)
is largely interpreted to subsume Article 7 (no-harm rule). 6 '
Perhaps because of the nature of international law writ large as well as the
lack of any clear and direct international enforcement mechanism, application of
the Convention's two guiding rules may lead to outcomes akin to a "double-
edged sword."' 66 It is thus unlikely that even with the availability of the
Convention's core provisions, the five littoral states will reach a mutual
162 EIA, supra note 10, at 8 (noting that the Kyapaz/Serdar oilfield was "originally discovered in 1959
by Azerbaijani geologists").
163 It must be noted that Turkmenistan's argument might fail in this dispute due to property- and
ownership-rights considerations, subjects outside the scope of this Comment.
164 One possible explanation for Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan's inability to reach a consensus could
be staunch Russian opposition to the construction of a trans-Caspian pipeline, which would
utilize the gas found in the Kyapaz/Serdar oilfield (in addition to two other oilfields) and "would
circumvent Russia and thus limit Kremlin's ability to control European-bound energy exports."
See Azerbaian & Turkmenistan, supra note 161.
165 Iran would have a more persuasive argument if the Convention were interpreted in the
alternative, such that both Articles 5 and 7 are considered complementary and on equal footing.
166 Jeffrey D. Azarva, Conflict on the Nile: International Watercourse Law and the Elusive Effort to Create a
Transboundagy Water Regime in the Nile Basin, 25 TEMP. INT'L & COMp. L. J 457, 492-93 (2011)
(noting that "rt]he same ambiguity that can help grease the wheels of negotiation can also serve to
reinforce parties' divergent bargaining positions, increasing the chance of conflict when one side's
performance fails to comport with the other party's understanding of that side's legal
obligations").
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understanding or agreement. After all, states are generally unwilling to
compromise, unless it is in their self-interest to do so, as demonstrated by
Russia's eventual acquiescence to the division of the Caspian seabed mainly due
to the country's powerful oil interests.167 However, regardless of what normative
positions the five littoral states end up assuming in the end, the Convention,
while not a panacea by any means, still provides a framework for resolving these
disputes that is more useful and practicable than UNCLOS or general customary
international law.
First, as compared to UNCLOS, the Convention does not inherently list
towards one or another result. It does not attempt to establish strict exclusive
economic zones or a territorial sea that Iran and Russia might find unfavorable
or, worse yet, unacceptable. Instead, the Convention strikes a middle ground by
providing that each state is entitled to an equitable use of the Caspian Sea, the
scope of which "depends on the facts and circumstances of each individual case
and, specifically, on a weighing of all relevant factors."' 68 Second, as compared
to postulates of customary international law, the Convention is not too open-
ended or lax. It does not wholly rely on the bilateral or multilateral actions of the
littoral states that have so far proven to be unfruitful. In place of self-help, it
offers a workable joint dispute-resolution mechanism that might channel and
focus the efforts of the individual states. The importance and effectiveness of
joint dispute-resolution mechanisms has been noted in academic literature,
particularly with respect to the Great Lakes case.169 In that case, the U.S. and the
British Colony of Upper Canada, albeit initially hostile to each other and
engaging in war between 1812 and 1814, managed to settle their territorial and
navigational disputes amicably and peacefully, primarily due to a 1909 Boundary
Waters Treaty. 7 ' This treaty also created an international joint commission to
prevent the outbreak of future disputes. 71 As a testament to its success, the joint
commission is still active today in resolving water disputes between the U.S. and
Canada.172 Similarly, the dispute-resolution mechanism provided by the
Convention could succeed in curbing self-interested behavior and outbreaks of
167 See Mehdiyoun, supra note 2, at 186 n.66 (noting that the Russian acquiescence took place only
after one of its oil companies, Lukoil, was granted a 10% interest in the Azerbaijani national oil
company).
168 Romano, supra note 27, at 153.
169 See, for example, Griffiths, supra note 1, at 185 ("One of the most enduring successes in the Great
Lakes regime has been the International Joint Commission, established by the 1909 Boundary
Waters Treaty, and is [sic] still active today in coordinating water use issues.") (emphasis omitted).
170 See Griffiths, supra note 1, at 183-84.
171 See id. at 185; Folger, supra note 96, at 549.
172 See Griffiths, supra note 1, at 185.
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self-help by providing the five littoral Caspian states with a path to resolving
disagreements and reconciling their differences.173
In sum, the advantages of the Convention in the Caspian context are
twofold: it lacks the strict, unworkable definition evident in UNCLOS, while
avoiding the legal morass caused by reliance on broad precepts of customary
international law, which includes the belief in interstate negotiation and
diplomacy as a means of rectifying the current standstill.
V. CONCLUSION
The Caspian Sea's history has been one of political disagreement, conflict,
and self-interest. The individual states are not willing to capitulate to their
counterparts' wishes and propositions, an arrangement that ultimately creates
and maintains gridlock and political uncertainty. Although attempts have been
made to reach bilateral agreements and to sign treaties, a mutually beneficial
framework has yet to be created. The academic literature has attempted to solve
the existing problems by applying to the Caspian two divergent legal principles:
the law of the sea and general customary international law. Despite their general
guidance, these mechanisms have failed to provide a clear solution to the
disputes. In an attempt to remedy the impasse, this Comment has approached
the Caspian question from a different perspective: that of the Watercourse
Convention, which has, so far, enjoyed only cursory mention in the academic
literature. The Convention contains principles and rules that could potentially
provide the much-needed means of resolving the conflict. In addition, the
Convention establishes a clear dispute-resolution mechanism, something that the
five littoral states are in dire need of, but have been unable to attain on their
own.
173 See Folger, supra note 96, at 550 ("If the Caspian littoral states were able to create a similar
arrangement, many future disputes could be avoided."); see also Kate Halloran, Is the International
Court of Justice the Right Forum for Transboundag Water Pollution Disputes, 10 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L &
POi.'Y 39, 39 (2009) (concluding that, instead of having the ICJ resolve transboundary water
disputes, "the international community must develop other methods of resolving transboundary
water pollution disputes before economic development and water quality suffer irrevocably").
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